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Abstract
In this paper, we present a simplified framework to represent competition, coordination and bargaining in
fisheries when they operate under financial and technological constraints. Competition within constraints
leads to a particular type of mathematical game in which the strategy choice by one player changes
strategy set of the other. By studying the equilibria and bargaining space of this game when players
maximize either profit or fishing capacity, we highlight that differences in financial constraints among
players leads to a tougher play, with a reduced bargaining space as the least constrained player can
readily exclude another from the competition. The exacerbating effects of constraints on competition
are even stronger when players maximize capacity. We discuss the significance of our results for global
ocean governance in a current context characterized by financialization and technological development.
We suggest that in order to maximize the chances of fruitful negociations and aim towards a fair sharing
of sea resources, it would be helpful to focus on leveling current differences in the constraints faced
between competing fishing systems by supporting local financial systems and technological control, before
implementing sophisticated economic tools.
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1. Introduction
Game theory and fisheries science have had a long intertwined history. The work of Gordon (1954) on
fisheries, which anticipated Hardin (1968)’s analysis of the tragedy of the common, was an application
of Cournot (1838)’s duopoly theory, which itself anticipated a Nash analysis of non-cooperative games
(see Leonard, 1994; Myerson, 1999 for historical sketches). Since then, game theory has been widely used
for the analysis of fishing systems and as theoretical guidance to organise the exploitation of our seas
(Sumaila, 1999; Kaitala and Lindroos, 2007; Bailey et al., 2010).
The close relationship between game theory and fisheries is illustrated by the use of the competition
for a shared fish resource as an example of the prisoner’s dilemma (Feeny et al., 1996). When fishing
systems maximize their profit, competition leads to a situation in which fishing systems earn less than
when they cooperate. Competition in this case ends in over-exploitation and over-capacity, hence the
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need to transition towards cooperation and coordination if the long term livelihood of fisheries is to be
maintained.
The distinction between competition, cooperation and coordination has been a key point of game theory
since John Nash’s work (Nash, 1950a,b, 1953), which gives a theoretical framework to the basic human
practice of bargaining. What has been referred to as Nash’s program (Binmore et al., 1986) still structures
game theoretical considerations of fisheries systems. The bulk of the work devoted to the use of game
theory for fisheries has focused on non-cooperative situations (Arnason et al., 2000; Lindroos and Kaitala,
2000) or, in the case of cooperation, on the formation of coalitions (Lindroos and Kaitala, 2000; Pintassilgo,
2003; Lindroos et al., 2005).
Fewer works have articulated fisheries problems in terms of cooperation, coordination and bargaining
(Armstrong, 1998). However, the view that these three processes underlie the relationships among fishing
systems at different levels has been endorsed by several authors, who argue that a poor understanding of
these process may have hindered our ability to tackle fishing crises (Fearon, 1998; Alcock, 2002; Munro,
2009). For instance, Alcock (2002) uses game theoretic concepts to argue that the collapse of cod in
Canada was at least partly due to a distributional conflict between small-scale and industrial fisheries.
The absence of theoretical tools to understand this type of distributional conflict contributed to its
delayed resolution and transition towards cooperation, resulting in catch diminutions coming about too
late.
Alcock (2002) points at two culprits for the emergence of conflict that are evocative of current problems
faced by many fisheries and that will guide our research. First, distributional conflict in Canada was
caused by small-scale and industrial fisheries suffering different constraints, due in particular to technical
and financial differences. Technological progress (Squires and Vestergaard, 2013) and financialization
(i.e. modernization and global expansion of financial tools, Epstein, 2005) have both been playing an
increasingly important role in fisheries who increasingly rely on finance to purchase ever more advanced
fleets. The two processes feedback to constrain fisheries’ scope of action as fisheries become increasingly
dependent on technology to increase catch in order to repay finance.
How technology and financialization influence the competitive and cooperative relationships between
fishing systems through the constraints they generate has not been much investigated. Constraint-based
game theory is an active field research that has been mostly concerned with games on networks (e.g.,
Contreras et al., 2004; Li and Marden, 2010, see Krawczyk, 2005 for an application to environmental
problems). Yet, the need for an assessment of the constraining effects of technology and finance is bolstered
by many current problems in fisheries other than distributional conflicts, such as the dangers of a rent-
maximisation principle in developing countries (Béné et al., 2010), or the economic and ecological stakes
associated with deep-sea fishing (Norse et al., 2012). Here, we will show that framing economical problems
related to the exploitation of renewable resources within constraints offers a change of perspective on
these problems as the effect of an agent’s action on another agent translates into diminishing its scope
of action, rather than only reducing its income.
The second cause of distributional conflict according to Alcock (2002) are differences in objectives between
small-scale and industrial fisheries (such as subsistence vs return on capital). Most of the applications of
game theory to fisheries have been based on the idea of profit maximization, and are therefore relevant
to one kind of rationality. The variety of modes of rationality at work in social-ecological systems such as
fishing systems (Berkes et al., 2008) can be uncovered by addressing the simple question : who (e.g., boat
skipper, firm owner, fishery, fleet, fishery manager, policy maker) maximizes what (e.g., catch, profit,
capacity, well-being, pleasure, peace) ? Ignoring the variety of modes of rationality in fishing systems
has been argued to be potentially damaging for the articulation of efficient fisheries policies (Bromley,
2009). In this paper, we will therefore be interested in the effects of rationality on the relationship between
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fishing systems and in particular, we will study the effects of capacity maximisation in addition to income
maximisation.
In view of the above considerations, we propose in this paper a constraint-based framework to study
competition, cooperation and rationality in fisheries systems. The paper is organized as follows. (1)
We define a game theoretical framework in order to consider technological and financial constraints,
and games between players with different rationalities. (2) We identify a crucial criterion : the viability
threshold of a player, which is the maximum yield that a player faced with technological and financial
constraints can reach. (3) We compare the outcomes of games within constraints among competing fishing
systems according to whether players maximize income or capital. In particular, we analyze the games’
equilibria and their bargaining space and find that the conditions that make it possible to move from
cooperation to coordination, to organize bargaining and to reach a fair distribution can be expressed
in terms of the viability thresholds of competing players. (4) We discuss the relevance of our results to
current problems related to ocean governance.
2. Model
2.1. A single fishing system in a constraint-based framework
In order to introduce our constraint framework, we first represent in a highly stylized way how financial
and technical imperatives constrain a single fishing system that exploits a fish stock and sells its yield
on a market. Such a fishing system could be a fishing country, its exclusive economic zone, its fleet and
its fish market. For ease of presentation, most of corresponding mathematical relationships are assumed
to be linear. Relaxing this assumption does not affect our results qualitatively. Throughout, upper- and
lower-case symbols denote variables and parameters respectively.
The fishing system with a capacity K for harvest expends an effort E, which cannot exceed capacity
(E ≤ K), into harvesting a fish stock that has a total biomass S. The yield Y from harvest depends
on the level of stock S, as well as on effort E, according to the usual formula, Y = qSE, where q is
the fishing efficiency coefficient and represents the technological level of the fishing system. In turn, the
biomass of fish stock S decreases with yield Y , S = r − sY, where r denotes the level of biomass in the
absence of fishing, and s captures the effect of fishing on biomass.
The profit of the fishing system depends on a balance of income and expenditures. Its only source of
income is from sales. Its yield Y is sold on the market, with unitary price P decreasing with the total
level of offer, P = a− bY, where a is the maximum unitary price, and b is the decrease in price according
to offer. The system faces two sources of expenditures. First, fishing activity is costly. Unitary fishing
costs decrease with stock according to : f = g + h/S. Secondly, access to the market is costly, with each
unit of yield having a cost m. The net profit I of the fishing system therefore is I = Y P − Y (f +m).
From the above, we see that fish stock S, fish price P , income I can be expressed in terms of yield Y
and fishing capacity K. Henceforth, we will consider that yield and capacity are exogenous and underlie
the behavior of the fishing system. The other variables are considered endogenous.
In conventional models of fisheries, the only – and often left unmentioned – constraint on a fishing system
is that profit must be non-negative : I ≥ 0. By contrast, in our framework, we will consider two constraints
on the system. First, finance imposes an imperative rate of return upon the capital, Kp where p is the
price of a fishing capacity unit of the fishing system. Financial constraint is expressed as : I ≥ Kpk,
where k is the imperative rate of return, which implies an upper bound on capital : K ≤ I/(pk). Second,
the capacity constraint E ≤ K can be re-written as Y/(qS) ≤ K.
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If we combine both constraints, we obtain a space of feasible states in terms of the endogenous variables,
capacity K and yield Y ,
E =
Y
qS
≤ K ≤ Y (P − f −m)
kp
=
I
pk
, (1)
that is shown in figure 1. With the idea that a system’s behaviour is defined by capacity K and yield Y ,
the size and shape of the space of feasible states constrain fishing behaviour. As shown in fig. 2, the space
of feasible states is particularly sensitive to finance constraints k and fishing efficiency q (i.e., technology).
The position of a fishing system within its feasible state space, and the corresponding effect on other
variables of this position, allows to infer on the underlying rationality of the system’s behaviour. As shown
in Fig 3, the position of a fishing system differs according to whether it seeks to maximize profit, capacity,
yield or rate of return. In particular, if a fishing system is positioned close to the capacity boundary, then
the corresponding fishing system is overcapacited and is not optimizing its profit because this requires
being close to minimal capacity. If it is close to the left boundary of the feasible space, the system is
overcapitalized, and again, it is not optimizing its profit. The explicit consideration of the constraints on
fisheries therefore offers an intuitive framework to visualise important features of fishing system, such as
excess capacity and overcapitalization.
2.2. Two fishing systems in a constraint-based framework
We now extend our constraint framework to two competing fishing systems, labelled A and B, that exploit
the same stock and sell their yield on the same market. A and B could be two countries with their own
fleets that fish in the same offshore part of the ocean and sell their yield on the same international market.
A and B respectively have capacitiesKA andKB and choose to expand an effort EA ≤ KA and EB ≤ KB
into fishing. The yields of both systems depend on their respective efforts and fishing efficiencies (qA and
qB), YA = qASEA and YB = qBSEB, respectively. Natural fishing stock and unitary selling market price
decrease with the yields of both fishing systems according to S = r−s(YA+YB) and P = a−b(YA+YB).
Fishing systems then differ in terms of fishing costs (fA = gA + hA/S, fB = gB + hB/S), marketing
costs (mA, mB), vessel values (pA, pB), and imperatives rates of return (kA, kB). The profits of A and
B then are IA = YA(P − fA −mA) and IB = YB(P − fB −mB), and must satisfy IA ≥ KApAkA and
IB ≥ KBpBkB , respectively.
As in the preceding section, we combine the constraints of the framework to find the space of feasible
states for each fishing system in terms of capacity and yield :
YA
qAS
≤ KA ≤ YA(P − fA −mA)
kApA
,
YB
qBS
≤ KB ≤ YB(P − fB −mB)
kBpB
.
(2)
By contrast to the single fishing system case, fish stock S and prices P depend on total yield YA + YB
here. Therefore the spaces of feasible states for each system are inter-dependent through the yield of the
other. In particular, if one fishing system increases its yield, it shrinks the feasible space of the other (fig.
4).
2.3. The viability threshold
The space of feasible states entail that there is a maximum total yield (YA for one fishing system, YA+YB
for two competing systems) that cannot be exceeded in order for fishing systems to survive. We define
this value as the viability threshold and write it as T (fig. 5). Its derivation and expression, when there
is a single fishing system, are given in appendix 1 (equation 4).
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If there is a single fishing system, the viability threshold depends negatively on the rate of return k and
positively on the fishing efficiency q, and on a balance between price and fixed costs : a−m− g (figure
2, see appendix 1, eqs. 5-7). The existence of a viability threshold is due to finance and its relationship
with technology : there is a value of yield that an system cannot exceed because otherwise, it is not able
to meet the financial imperatives that are necessary to purchase the technology to generate that yield.
If there are two fishing systems, their viability thresholds TA and TB depend on the properties of each
system in the same way as when there is only one fishing system (eq. 4 in appendix 1) : the viability
threshold of a system depends negatively on rates of return (kA or kB) and positively on the fishing
efficiency (qA or qB) and on a balance of prices and costs (a −mA − gA or a −mB − gB). This means
that the viability thresholds of two competing may be different. As a consequence, some amount of
total yield may be viable for one system, but simultaneously be the death warrant for the other (e.g., if
TB < YA + YB < TA, then only A can survive).
2.4. Competition of two fishing systems within constraints
Within these constraints, we now assume that fishing systems have a quantified objective for which they
compete. This competition can be expressed as a non-cooperative game, in which players are fishing
systems, strategies are pairs of yield and capacity, and payoffs are their quantified objective. As the
set of feasible strategies of a player depends on the strategy of the other, such a game is said to be a
Generalized Nash’s equilibrium Problem (Facchinei et al., 2007). As usual, the equilibria of the game
are pairs of strategies ((YA,KA), (YB ,KB)) such that when a player unilaterally changes its strategy, it
obtains a smaller payoff (Facchinei et al., 2007).
We will study the game and its equilibria under two scenarios. In the first scenario, the quantified objective
of the systems is profit. When A and B have equal viability thresholds (TA = TB), both systems stably
co-exist (fig. 6, top). When A and B have different viability thresholds (TA 6= TB), the situation is more
complicated (fig. 6, middle and bottom). For the sake of argument, suppose the viability threshold of A
is greater than B’s (TA > TB), i.e., A is in a dominant position and can exclude B from the competition
by choosing a yield greater than B’s viability threshold (TA > YA > TB). We find two possible outcomes,
either A’s optimal (i.e., which maximises profit) yield is greater than TB in which case B is excluded and
dies out, or A’s optimal yield is lower than TB in which case B survives (this is what is plotted in fig. 6,
right). The greater the difference between the viability thresholds of two competing systems, the more
likely one system will vanish (fig. 6, bottom).
In the second scenario, the quantified objective of the systems is capacity. Under this scenario, we
find that when A and B have equal viability thresholds, the game has an infinite number of equilibria
(fig. 7, top). Every sharing of the total yield, which equals the viability threshold of both systems
(YA + YB = TA = TB), is a possible equilibrium. This process can be characterized by a Nash demand
game (Nash, 1953). In order for them to stably co-exist, it is therefore for them to agree on how to
share the total yield. Cooperation in this case is a requirement. When A and B have different viability
thresholds, the game has a single equilibrium under which only the system with the greatest viability
threshold survives (fig. 7, bottom). This is because by maximizing its capacity, the system with the
greatest viability threshold always pushes the total yield above the threshold of the other system, which
can no longer satisfy its financial constraints and thus goes out of business.
2.5. Coordination and bargaining of two fishing systems in a constraint-based framework
In some cases, there exists pairs ((YA,KA), (YB ,KB)) of strategies that are away from the Nash equili-
brium and that provide a better reward to both players. Such strategies constitute the bargaining space
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of the system as both players have an interest to bargain in order to reach these strategies. Bargaining
spaces are plotted in the right parts of figs 6 and 7. Inside the bargaining there is what is referred to as
the Pareto frontier. It is made of pairs of strategies such that an unilateral change of strategy results in a
smaller reward to one one player (see (Muthoo, 1999) for definitions). The goal of bargaining is to reach
a point on the Pareto frontier.
As the top and centre right plots of fig. 6 illustrate, when players maximize profit and have equal or
marginally different viability thresholds, a bargaining space exists. Hence, competing players may reach
an agreement through bargaining. This situation parallels the prisoner’s dilemma problem : both players
may reap greater payoffs if they coordinate to cooperate. When have important differences in viability
thresholds, the bargaining space is empty (bottom right of fig. 6) is because the dominant player has no
interest in bargaining : it can simply eliminate the other from the competition. Differences in viability
thresholds therefore reduce the possibilities of coordination.
When players maximize their capacity and have equal viability thresholds, the bargaining space is large
(top right of fig. 7) because all pairs of possible strategies other than the Nash equilibrium provide a
better reward. However, the situation is different to the case when players maximise profit because here,
the threat values of a player (i.e., the maximum payoff it obtains in the absence of negotiation and with
the other player’s worst strategy) is zero. Bargaining is therefore imperative and the situation is akin
to a pure demand game in which players have to agree on the sharing of a pie (Nash, 1953). When
players maximize capacity, any difference in viability thresholds leads to the collapse of the bargaining
space (centre and bottom right of fig. 7). As before, this is because the dominant player can exclude the
other from the competition and thus has no need to bargain. The sensitivity of the bargaining space to
difference in viability thresholds when players maximize capacity highlights that when fishing systems
operate with modes of rationality other than profit maximization, possibilities for bargaining can be
significantly destabilized.
Our analyses show that differences in viability thresholds compromise the co-existence of multiple systems,
first by exacerbating the effects of competition and second by shrinking the possibilities of bargaining.
This is particularly so when capacity is maximized. When systems have different viability thresholds
and are maximizing capacity, two steps are necessary to ensure their long-term survival. First, fisheries
management must aim at equalizing viability thresholds among competing systems. Recall that viability
thresholds T depend positively on cost related function (a−m−f) and fishing efficiency q, and negatively
on rates of returns k. There are therefore three ways to equalize viability thresholds. For the sake of
argument, suppose that A is dominant over B, i.e., TB < TA. Then, to reach TB = TA, it is possible to
modulate costs (i.e., increase (a−mB−fB) and/or decrease (a−mA−fA)), to change fishing efficiencies
(i.e., increase B’s qb and/or decrease A’s qA), or change the rates of return (i.e., increase A’s kA and/or
decrease B’s kB). Second, players must find a fair division of the yield between them.
3. Discussion
3.1. Results summary
We have framed a game between fishing systems within the technological and financial constraints they
face. These constraints are reflected in the existence of viability thresholds, which correspond to the
maximum total fish resource that a fishing system can catch. A fishing system cannot exceed its viability
threshold because otherwise, it is not able to meet the financial imperatives that are necessary to purchase
the technology to generate that yield. Different fishing systems exploiting the same resources influence
one another by constraining their scope of action, and when actors face different constraints, one can
potentially “kill" the other by pushing the system above the viability threshold of its competitor.
When we analysed games’ equilibria and bargaining spaces, we found that they depend critically on
viability thresholds and how they differ among players. When fishing systems have different viability
thresholds, competition is exaggerated, and the transition towards coordination through bargaining that
is needed to avoid over-exploitation and over-capacity is compromised. This is because when a dominant
can simply eliminate the other from the competition, it has no motivation in finding a solution through
bargaining.
3.2. About fishing capacity maximization behavior
We found that the effects of differences in viability thresholds are particularly important when fishing
systems maximize capacity. This result leads to the question of the pertinence of such a behaviour, which
may appear incongruous at first. The difference between profit maximisation and capacity maximisation
as a goal can be framed as a question : at national level, do national fishing policies encourage investment
in boats for insuring a bigger income to a country, or do they target a minimal profit to fishing companies
for insuring the development of their national fishing fleet ? Or, at another level, do fishing entities acquire
big boats to catch fish and thus earn money, or do they sell fish in order to earn money and thus finance
big boats ? The answer to such questions is not obvious, at least to us.
Capacity maximisation is perhaps the most parsimonious explanation to overinvestment and overcapa-
city (Bell et al., 2016). A more explicit illustration of fishing capacity maximisation can be found in
deliberate national policies. In India for example, there have been 12 national plans since 1950 that all
support capacity development (Bhathal, 2014), which has led to significant excess capacity, a production
that exceeds the needs of the country (Bhathal and Pauly, 2008; World-Bank, 2010; Sathyapalan et al.,
2011; Bhathal, 2014) and a national opposition to any international agreement for banning subsidies
(Campling and Havice, 2013). This nationwide increase of capacity was initially motivated by the neces-
sity to develop and to eradicate poverty (Thorpe et al., 2005), but seems today to be motivated by the
anticipation of competition with fleets from developed countries (Campling and Havice, 2013)..
The notion that fishing entities favour an increase in capacity also provides a straightforward explanation
to (1) the failures of decommissioning schemes (i.e., plans for decreasing fleets size through buybacks) even
when they come at the expense of profit (Holland et al., 1999), (2) the observation that most subsidies,
whatever their intentions, are redirected towards new equipment (Sumaila et al., 2010), (3) the high
technical turnover (i.e., capital stuffing Townsend, 1985) that has been observed in many fishing entities
(Pauly et al., 2002). Capacity maximisation in fisheries behaviour may be motivated by the anticipation
of future capacity limitations (Guyader and Thébaud, 2001), of individual quotas distributed according
to capacity (Squires et al., 1995), or of subsidies of buybacks programs (Clark et al., 2005), or by the
desire to diminish the risk of exploiting a highly variable resource (Branch et al., 2006).
In addition, the standard hypothesis that fishing systems behave as to maximise profit does not always
fit well with the empirical evidence. Fisheries anthropology (Acheson, 1981; Palsson, 1988; Olson, 1997),
studies on fishermen behavior (Jentoft, 1989; Salas and Charles, 2007; Holland, 2008; Rijnsdorp et al.,
2008) and on their communities (Jentoft, 2000; Pomeroy et al., 2006; Béné et al., 2010) describe fishermen
who are mostly committed to their occupation, even if that means remaining poor, and who co-exist
by relying on mutualistic rules (Jentoft, 1986; Allison and Ellis, 2001). They constitute closely-knit,
sometimes closed, societies, within which competition is often symbolical : for the biggest fish, the biggest
catch, the most productive fishing plots, the most efficient gear, the biggest boat or the best skipper
(Palsson, 1988).
Altogether, these observations lend support to the idea the some fishing systems are not only concerned
with profit, but may also seek to increase capacity as a goal. The significant effects of capacity maxi-
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misation on constrained fisheries that we observed on our results call for future assessments of whether
such behaviour is at play, and more in-depth analysis of its effects on competition and bargaining.
3.3. The future for ocean governance
As economic development and population growth increase demand for seafood, technological progress is
opening up new fishing areas in high- and deep-seas, which according to the 1982 United Nations Conven-
tion on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) are governed by a principle of freedom of fishing (Oda, 1983). For
reasons that are biological, ethical (Moore and Squires, 2016; Barbier et al., 2014; Brooks et al., 2013) or
economic (Rogers et al., 2014), a growing number of calls have been made to control access and organise
negotiations on how to distribute fishing pressure in these new areas (Hayashi, 2004; Molenaar, 2005;
Moore and Squires, 2016; Barbier et al., 2014). Future issues faced by such a global ocean governance
and how they relate to our results can be understood by first considering the context in which they would
take place.
The institutional context is one in which governance depends on multilateral negotiations (Barrett, 2005),
which rely on a principle of efficiency (negotiation must succeed) and of rationality (players must have an
interest in the success of the negotiation). Meanwhile, the economic context is one of globalization and
financialization (Whalen, 2001), which in fishing systems generates highly competitive, highly efficient,
excessively capitalized fishing entities (Squires and Vestergaard, 2013; Eigaard et al., 2014) due to a
mutual reinforcement of technical progress, financial modernization and competitiveness. Finally, the
international political context is underlain by a requirement for equity (Ostrom et al., 1999; Kaul et al.,
1999; Rao, 1999; Sen, 1999), which emphasizes that how the access to fish is shared should be fair,
especially for developing countries (Allison, 2001).
In view of this context and our results, we may anticipate several possible futures for ocean governance.
First, a politically stressed international context leads to the abandonment of the principle of equity
and all obstacles to sea grabbing are lifted. The re-enforcement of technology, finance and competition
continues and leads to a world in which only a small number of large fishing companies survive by
providing revenues to the globalized finance system. Second, following what has been done for climate
change negotiations, countries agree on an institutional frame but do not consider any kind of rationality
other than profit maximization, and thus proceed to use tools such as side payments to ensure equity,
which probably fail for the same reasons buybacks programs fail. Third, the re-enforcement of technology,
finance and competition is halted by fisheries policies that (1) maintain fragile differentiated independent
local finance systems, such as local cooperative credit systems, in order to emancipate fishing entities
from globalized finance ; and (2) stabilise fishing efficiency at a reasonable level, instead of systematically
promoting competition by encouraging efficiency. As a result, viability thresholds are levelled, bargaining
spaces are enlarged and the equity issue can be appropriately addressed.
3.4. Conclusion
To conclude, our model highlights that because the competition of fishing systems occurs within constraints,
it is inherently unfair as differences in viability thresholds can lead to the survival of only the most viable
fishing systems. This unfairness is exaggerated when fishing systems operate with modes of rationa-
lity other than profit maximization, such as capacity maximisation, that destabilize the possibilities for
bargaining. Altogether, our results lead us to question the relevance of creating economical tools, such
property rights, fishing rights or side payments, that aim towards enlarging the space of bargaining in
the framework of the prisoner’s dilemma, adding to the growing number of voices that question this
framework (Feeny et al., 1990; Alcock, 2002; Richerson et al., 2002). In order to fulfill the demands of
equity on future global governance, we suggest that it would be more relevant to focus on equalizing the
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constraints on fishing systems (i.e., their viability thresholds) by paying special attention to their local
financial systems and by limiting technological development.
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4. Appendix 1 : Computing viability threshold
We show here that there exists a maximal value for yield and give its expression. We start from the
technological and finance constraints on yield that have been obtained in above equation 1 :
E =
Y
qS(Y )
≤ K ≤ Y (P (Y )− f(Y )−m)
kp
Using definitions : S(Y ) = r − sY , P (Y ) = a− bY and f(Y ) = g + h/S(Y ), they can be developed as :
1
q(r − sY ) ≤
1
kp
× ((a− bY )− (g + h
r − sY )−m)
That is :
kp ≤ ((a− bY )− (g + h
r − sY )−m)(q(r − sY ))
To simplify, we put l = a− g −m. Obviously situations with l < 0 are meaningless. It is routine to show
that previous inequality can be re-written as :
AY 2 +BY + C ≥ 0 (3)
With
A = bqs
B = (−bqr − aqs+ gqs+mqs) = −q(br + sl) ≤ 0
C = (−kp− hq + qrl) = q(rl − h)− kp
We look for values of Y satisfying inequality 3. We solve the corresponding second degree equation.
Possible yields if they exist are outside its roots. Its discriminant is :
∆ = q2(br + sl)2 − 4qbs(qlr − (qh+ kp))
= q2(br − sl)2 + 4qbs(qh+ kp) > 0
Solutions are :
T1 =
q(br + sl)−√∆
2bqs
T2 =
q(br + sl) +
√
∆
2bqs
Recall that S = r − sY . Thus we are interested only in values of Y that are outside roots and such that
Y ≤ r/s. We remark that we have :
√
∆ =
√
(br − sl)2 + 4qbs(qh+ kp) > |br − sl|
We deduce :
r
s
− T1 = br − sl
2bs
+
√
∆
2bs
> 0
T2 − r
s
=
−br + sl
2bs
+
√
∆
2bs
> 0
Therefore, values of Y greater than T2 are not valid. Possible values for Y are thus such that Y ≤ T1.
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Values of parameters (a, b, s, r, g, h, etc.) resulting in a system with T1 < 0 are not realistic.
Finally the viability threshold is :
T =
q(br + sl)−
√
∆
2bqs
(4)
It is easy to derive the dependency of the viability threshold according to systems parameters. We have :
∂T
∂q
=
kp
q
√
∆
> 0 (5)
∂T
∂k
= − p√
∆
< 0 (6)
∂T
∂l
=
1
2b
√
∆+ q(br − ls)√
∆
≥ 1
2b
√
∆− |q(br − ls)|√
∆
> 0 (7)
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Tables
Maximizing profit Maximizing capacity
Equal viability thresholds One equilibrium with co-existence of both
fishing systems.
An explorable bargaining space
Every share of the total yield, which
equals the viability threshold, is a Nash
equilibrium.
The bargaining space is made of all pos-
sible pairs of strategies. The Pareto fron-
tier is made of a sharing of the yield at the
common value of viability thresholds.
Sligthly different viability
thresholds
One equilibrium which allows the co-
existence of both systems.
An explorable, but complicated, bargai-
ning space.
One equilibrium with the survival of only
the dominant system.
Bargaining space is empty.
Different viability thre-
sholds
One equilibrium with the survival of only
the dominant system.
Bargaining space is empty.
One equilibrium with the survival of only
the dominant system.
Bargaining space is empty.
Table 1: Competition between fishing systems. Nash equilibria and bargaining space.
15
Figures captions
Figure 1: The space of feasible states for a fishing system. A fishing system is defined by its yield Y (x-axis) and its
capacity K (y-axis). The lower bound reflects the technical constraint : a minimal capacity is required to achieve a certain
yield. The upper bound, meanwhile, is the financial constraint. Together, the constraints define a feasible state space where
capacity allows yield and yield allows to finance capacity. Feasible states are shown in green.
Figure 2: Effects of fishing efficiency and rate of return on feasible space. Left : Decreasing fishing efficiency q increases
the minimal capacity and shrinks the feasible space. Right : Increasing rate of return k decreases the maximum capacity
and and shrinks the feasible space
Figure 3: Constraints and rationality. The space of feasible state is colored (increasing from green to yellow) according
to the values of variables (endogenous yield and capacity or exogenous profit and rate of return.
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Figure 4: Competition between fishing systems. The feasible set of a fishing system depends on the yield of the other
fishing system
Figure 5: Viability thresholds of two competing fishing systems
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Figure 6: Competitive equilibrium and bargaining space with profit maximisation. From top to bottom row : (a) equal
viability thresholds : V T (A) = V T (B) = 400, (b) slightly different viability thresholds : V T (A) = 400, V T (B) = 300, (c)
different viability thresholds V T (A) = 400, V T (B) = 200. From left to right column : (a) how profit of A depends on yields
YA and YB ; white areas corresponds to infeasible states (total yields exceeds the viability threshold of A) ; (b) how profit of
B depends on yields YA and YB ; (c) Nash equilibrium of the competitive game (red line, the best strategy of A according
to B’s strategy ; green line, the best strategy of B according to A’s strategy ; gray lines show how equilibrium can be reached
by successive adjustments corresponding to different starting points) ; (d) the bargaining space lies at the intersection of
the green area (where A get a better reward than at Nash’s equilibrium) and the red area (where A get a better reward than
at Nash’s equilibrium).
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Figure 7: Competitive equilibrium and bargaining space with capacity maximisation. Similar to figure 6. With equal viability
thresholds, the bargaining space is mad of all possibles pairs of strategies. When they are different, it is empty.
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